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Reflections on Insight
A Reply to Lana Kühle
Ursula Voss
In this reply to Kühle, I will respond to her comments on the role of insight in lu-
cid dreaming, especially regarding the question of whether it may be knowledge-
based or instead express a sensorial experience. My answer rests on experimental
findings,  acknowledging  Kühle’s  remarks,  and taking  her  methodological  chal-
lenges into account. I will challenge her proposal that insight might be called a
state, opting for a definition of a transient thought atypically embedded within the
state of dreaming, which may suffice to retrospectively call a REM dream lucid,
but which will not satisfy the assumptions underlying the existence of a state.
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1 Introduction
The commentary by Kühle reminds me of a re-
mark  made  by  a  distinguished  and  renowned
Swiss  sleep researcher who asked me recently,
during a lengthy discussion of our work on lucid
dreaming, “how can you be sure that what you
call a dream really exists”. In other words, he
wanted to know how we could prove that dream
narratives were memories of REM-sleep mental
activity instead of, say, fantasies occurring dur-
ing  the  process  of  awakening  or  memories  of
hypnagogic  hallucinations,  etc.  It  struck  me
then that I had neglected to openly postulate
the key assumption that our work rested upon,
namely that dreams really exist. So I still owe
him a detailed response and Kühle’s comment-
ary provides me now with the opportunity to
generate an adequate reply. In the following, I
will  focus  on  Kühle’s  main  argument,  which
seems  to  circle  around  the  definition  of  “in-
sight” and the question of whether it represents
an epistemological statement or a phenomenolo-
gical experience. I will shortly enter into discus-
sion of whether it is justified to define insight as
a state, as this assumption is not to be deduced
from our work but certainly points to a need for
clarification.  While  interesting,  I  will  refrain
from  commenting  on  her  speculations  on
whether insight may or may not be an ability
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except for proclaiming that in my view, insight
represents  nothing but a result  of  neurobiolo-
gical processes we still know far too little about.
However, it is a fact that entering the state of
lucid dreaming can be trained. Can insight per
se  be trained? I  doubt it.  Can the ability  to
generate insight be trained? According to recent
studies on gamma-band activity in the develop-
ing  and  mature  brain  (see  references  in  the
main text), it is at least a possibility. 
2 The role of insight in lucid dreaming
In her commentary, Kühle claims that the way
we use the term “insight” leaves many—mostly
philosophical—questions  unanswered.  While  I
certainly  agree  in  principle  that  solving  one
question often generates many others, I also be-
lieve that there is some need for clarification re-
garding terminology. It seems that the discus-
sion of what insight is and what it isn’t reveals
one  of  the  key  methodological  differences
between our disciplines. Whereas philosophy of
mind is mainly involved in meta-theory and the
conceptualization of psychological theories, the
focus  of  experimental  psychology  lies  on  the
testing of hypotheses, albeit neither foci apply
exclusively.  By  definition,  however,  experi-
mental  psychology  aims  at  identifying  cause-
and-effect relationships between observable phe-
nomena by applying experimental  methods to
induce controlled manipulations of so-called “in-
dependent  variables”,  leading  to  reproducible
changes in “dependent variables”. Although ex-
periments are hypothesis-based, testing specific
(confirmatory) or unspecific predictions (explor-
atory)  derived  from  theory,  progress  is  often
made when such an experiment leads to an un-
predicted result. Such was the case in the con-
struction of our LuCiD scale.
In the set of lucid and non-lucid dreams
investigated  and  reported  on  by  our  group
(Voss et  al. 2013),  we  identified  a  factorial
structure in which eight item clusters (which
differed from the theoretically predicted ones)
showed sufficient  common variability to con-
sider  the  items  within  each  cluster  related.
These eight factors accounted for a large por-
tion  of  variance  in  dream  consciousness  as
defined a priori, and based on theoretical con-
siderations. The items in the item pool statist-
ically  identified  as  the  single  factor  we  re-
ferred to as “insight” pertained to the verbal
communication that one knew one was dream-
ing while  the dream continued.  As such,  in-
sight  would have to be regarded (in  an epi-
stemological sense) as understanding that at a
particular  moment  within  the  dream,  the
dreamer acquired knowledge about his or her
state of consciousness, which would be the hy-
brid state of lucid dreaming. 
As Kühle correctly points out,  this may
or may not be true, however. It is just as pos-
sible that a dreamer who states upon his or her
awakening: “I  knew it was a dream while the
dream continued” only thought that he or she
knew,  while  in  truth,  he  or  she  may  have
sensed,  felt,  or  experienced that  the  ongoing
dream action  was  not  real.  This  would  then
pertain to a phenomenological experience sim-
ilar to what Duncker (1947) refers to as “con-
scious  participation”  (p.  505),  describing  the
sensorial experience that one is, at a particular
moment,  consciously  aware  of  (pp.  508–509).
On the other  hand,  even if  we really experi-
enced insight in a phenomenological sense, how
can we be  sure that  this  experience  was not
the result of the epistemological recognition of
some sort of incongruence within the dream at
some particular point in time? To me, this line
of thought resembles that revolving around the
question of whether we can be certain that a
dream  is  really  a  dream  and  not  something
else. Philosophically, this is of course fascinat-
ing. But to experimental psychologists, such a
discussion is unsettling because it is so difficult
to  translate  into  testable,  i.e.,  operationaliz-
able,  hypotheses.  Our  admittedly  very  prag-
matic approach is to define underlying assump-
tions such as  “we assume that dream reports
generated  from  REM  sleep  awakenings  are
mentations  generated  during  REM sleep  and
(fractionally) remembered (at least) until ques-
tioning”  or  “we  assume  that  verbal  accounts
are reliable and valid”. These assumptions can
then again be  challenged by separate  experi-
mental studies. In the case of doubting the ex-
istence  of  REM sleep  dreams,  an  experiment
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could be set up, for example, interrupting dif-
ferent  states  of  arousal  such  as  meditation,
daydreaming, NREM sleep, or REM sleep and
questioning the subject with respect to imme-
diate recollections of  mental activity. A com-
parison would lead to the conclusion that re-
ports from REM sleep awakenings differ funda-
mentally  from  reports  gathered  from  other
states of arousal. This has, of course, been suc-
cessfully  achieved  and  repeated  many  times.
However, the question is still not solved. It is
doubtful, for example, whether an arousal from
REM sleep enables as accurate a report as an
arousal from the meditative state. Similarly, we
cannot exclude the possibility that REM sleep
alters mnemonic processes in a different way to
NREM sleep, so that obvious discrepancies in
NREM and REM reports are due to state-de-
pendent  retrieval  and  filtering  processes  and
not at all related to different fantasies gener-
ated during the particular state. 
In the same way, it certainly is appropri-
ate to wonder about the true nature of what
we refer to as “insight”. To psychologists, the
explanation that a factor name is really only
an  attempt  to  describe  a  commonality
between  different  but  related  observations  is
probably  satisfactory.  To  philosophers,  this
will of course not be the case. However, with
psychological  pragmatism  in  mind,  I  would
like to point to some empirical findings (and
their  immanent  difficulties)  regarding  the
question on how to further explore the nature
of insight in lucid dreams: when we construc-
ted  the  LuCiD  scale  (Voss et  al. 2013),  we
started out with a set of 50 items that were
selected on the basis of theoretical considera-
tion. In a first step, these items were tested on
a  large  sample  of  dreamers,  leading  to  158
dream narratives considered valid. These were
then analyzed for factorial structure as well as
for  item reliability.  Several  items that might
have  been  potentially  informative  regarding
the question of  epistemology vs.  phenomeno-
logy proved either indistinct in differentiating
between  lucid  and non-lucid  dreams  or  they
yielded too high statistical item difficulties so
that they had to be eliminated from further
evaluation. Some examples are:
• While dreaming my sensations were the same
as  when I  imagine  something  or  daydream
during wakefulness
• While dreaming I was convinced that I was
awake. 
• I wasn’t in the dream, I had no self. 
• While dreaming I felt that I knew where I
was sleeping. 
• While dreaming I was more than one person.
This finding of no-difference is of course by no
means  sufficiently  informative  to  consider  the
question of insight in dreaming solved or even
solvable. The finding of high item difficulty in
particular poses some problems: items are con-
sidered difficult if they do not yield a reason-
able number of affirmative answers (Moosbrug-
ger 2008;  Schermelleh-Engel &  Werner 2008).
Thus, an item that is not often selected as true
will  be  eliminated  from  analysis  although  it
might  contain  valuable  information,  e.g.,  that
the statement is considered false by the major-
ity  of  participating  subjects.  Further,  in  the
case of subjects awakened from sleep, they may
not affirm an item although it is true, simply
because they are not yet able to comprehend its
content (sleep inertia). For example, the item “I
wasn’t in the dream, I had no self” was not of-
ten selected as true. Was this because in most
cases, dreamers felt they did have a self or was
it  because  they  didn’t  understand  what  was
asked of them? I hope that this example high-
lights some of the problems that arise when we
try  to  subject  philosophical  theory  to  experi-
mental testing. Perhaps a different design, opt-
ing for a specific comparison of  questions ad-
dressing  epistemology vs.  phenomenology dur-
ing a steady state of wakefulness (such as mind-
wandering or meditation) might generate more
concrete answers, avoiding sleep inertia effects
should they exist. We look forward to such res-
ults.
3 Insight as a state of consciousness?
According to Kühle,  our results suggest that
insight may be considered a state. Moreover,
she claims that the LuCiD scale does not al-
low for the identification of different lucidity
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levels.  These  assumptions  are  not  to  be  de-
duced from our research but must stem from a
misconception  or  misunderstanding  of  the
factorial  structure  of  the  LuCiD scale.  Con-
cerning this  matter,  we reported that  dream
consciousness  can  be  described  by  eight
factors,  six  of  which  are  capable  of  distin-
guishing between lucid and non-lucid dreams:
insight, control, dissociation, positive emotion,
negative emotion, and memory. A person can
have a range of scores in each factor, for ex-
ample in insight, such that scores are graded
and allow for varying degrees of lucidity. Fur-
thermore, the factors identified are correlated,
i.e.,  not  independent  (see  Voss et  al. 2013),
which means that one factor alone may not be
sufficient to define a lucid dream. Our results
also suggest that a dream might be considered
lucid even with low scores of insight! So the
assumption that the state of lucid dreaming is
equivalent  to  the  proposed  state  of  insight
cannot be inferred from our data. Kühle’s pro-
posal reveals another problem, however,  that
we tried  to  address  with  our  Space  of  Con-
sciousness  model  (SoC),  which  is  the  defini-
tion  of  “state”.  What  is  the  relationship
between a state of arousal and a state of con-
sciousness? In the case of insight, the recogni-
tion “I am dreaming” may be only a fleeting
thought. But this thought is embedded in rel-
atively  enduring  neurophysiological  patterns
such  as  regional  changes  in  blood  oxygen
levels (see  Dresler et al. 2012) and enhanced
gamma activity in frontal regions (Voss et al.
2009;  Voss et  al. 2014).  Our  suggestion  to
situate  lucid  dreaming  within  the  SoC  at-
tempts to incorporate theses observations. In
my view, a state is comparable to background
activity  enabling  or  disabling  certain  transi-
ents such as thoughts or memories. It is cour-
ageous to consider a fleeting thought a state,
and I think such definition would need more
detailed specifications. Of course, one may ask
whether  a  dream  would  be  considered  lucid
even in the absence or perhaps following the
thought “this  is  a  dream”.  According to our
model, this assumption would have to be af-
firmed. If the state of lucid dreaming is con-
sidered a neurophysiological state of sleep bor-
dering wakefulness, enabling the mind to pro-
duce a transient thought (insightful thought),
this thought may or may not be repeated sev-
eral times within the state of lucid dreaming.
The  important  factor  is,  as  Kühle  proposes,
capability. During the state of lucid dreaming,
the mind is able to be insightful. It is not the
other way around, such that the mind is able
to enter a lucid dream during the thought of
insight. The importance of insightful thought
thus does not lie in its being a state but in it
being measurable! We cannot expect a subject
to provide a truthful answer to the question
“were  your  frontal  lobes  producing  gamma
band  activity?”  We  can,  though,  ask  about
the quality of  their  thoughts and sensations.
Finally, if, in spite of my objections, we define
insight as a state of consciousness, how would
this state be defined in terms of arousal (see
the SoC model), or in terms of other determ-
inants such as, for example, judging, sensing,
or moving? Supposed insight were defined as a
point in the SoC. Where would it be located?
Within  mindwandering,  meditation,  lucid
dreaming, focused attention—or all of these?
4 Conclusion
While  Kühle’s  comments  are  greatly  appreci-
ated,  they  show  how  important  dialogue
between  the  different  disciplines  involved  in
studying  consciousness  really  is.  Neuroscience,
psychology, and philosophy are all connected in
their  quest  for  a  better  understanding  of  the
true nature of consciousness and its underlying
physiology. They depend on each other to for-
mulate predictions based on theory, and to test
and reappraise these on the grounds of cause-
and-effect relationships established through ex-
perimental testing. Experimental research rests
upon certain assumptions that may not or may
only fractionally apply to philosophy. The most
important assumptions of dream science are to
consider it true that there exists a real world
(1),  that  REM  sleep  dreams  exist  (2),  that
healthy awake humans are able to make valid
statements about knowing and feeling (3), and
that restrictions to this ability (e.g., sleep iner-
tia) can be reliably identified (4). 
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